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Introduction
Are collateral and credit market competition complements or substitutes when it comes to facilitate bank credit to firms of different quality? Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that under information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders young and opaque firms will have more credit available and at lower cost in credit markets where banks have market power than in perfectly competitive credit markets. This welfare enhancing effect of market power of banks challenges the most conventional view that market power causes a social dead weight loss. However, little is known about how credit market competition and use of collateral interact in determining the availability and cost of credit, even though to pledge collateral is a well-documented common practice in loan contracts 1 . If we find that collateral is an alternative to market power in increasing credit availability to firms, then fostering competition in credit markets at the pace at which more collateral is available will increase both static and dynamic efficiency of credit markets. This paper provides empirical evidence supporting this conclusion. The literature that focuses on the role played by financial markets in economic growth 2 largely ignores collateral availability. The results presented here call for a more careful scrutiny of the role played by collateral in determining the relationship between financial development and economic growth.
Townsend (1982) shows that multi period contracting is more efficient than single period contracting in dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard. Credit availability to firms will increase when lending banks have market power, compared with credit availability when they do not, because market power makes more difficult for borrowing firms to renegotiate the contract ex post and consequently multiperiod contracting becomes more feasible [Petersen and Rajan (1995) ]. On the other hand, Bester (1985) , and Besanko and
Thakor (1987a and b), among others, show that to pledge collateral can mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets. Therefore, collateral can be an alternative to market power of banks to increase availability of bank finance for firms.
In this paper we evaluate the substitution between market power and collateral by extending the Petersen and Rajan model on multiperiod contracting. This will allow banks to ask for collateral as a condition for granting a loan. Petersen and Rajan show that market power lowers the lower bound of credit quality of new borrowers that get finance, since it increases the pay off of the bank in future periods. The extended model shows that collateral also lowers the average quality of borrowers that get bank finance in a given credit market. The reason is that with collateral banks can ask for higher interest rates in the first period without violating the moral hazard constraint that forces borrowers to choose the good project. Consequently, the acceptable probability that the borrower is of good quality, from the break-even condition of the bank, can be lower. Thus, our extension
shows that the effect of higher market power in credit availability is lower in markets with collateral than in markets without collateral. In other words, collateral and market power are substitutes when it comes to increase credit availability.
In addition, the paper investigates the consequences of the interaction between collateral and market power in determining the loan interest rate. First period interest rate is 2. See King and Levine (1993) , Levine and Zervos (1998) or Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
an increasing function of the lower bound in borrowers' credit quality in the particular market.
Variables that affect the lower bound such as market power and collateral will affect the interest rate. The prediction from the model is that the average interest rate in bank loans to borrowers of unobserved credit quality will increase for banks lending in markets where lower credit quality borrowers get loans, but the increase will be lower in markets where banks have more market power. The result is expected to hold when credit quality is substituted by availability of collateral.
Empirical predictions are tested using extensive data from two different Spanish Using the province level data we find that the average credit quality of borrowers in a province decreases with availability of collateral and with credit market concentration in that province. We also observe that the cross effect of the two explanatory variables is positive, so the net effect of each variable is higher at low values of the other. The empirical relationship between interest rates of bank loan, collateral and market concentration is consistent with the results obtained with province data. A positive effect of market concentration in the availability of credit to borrowers of lower quality is also documented in Petersen and Rajan (1995) with US data on loans to small and medium size firms. But the interaction between credit market concentration and availability of collateral as joint determinants of the availability of credit for low quality borrowers is new in the empirical literature.
Market power is a key variable in theoretical models but difficult to observe and measure in empirical analysis. In this paper, as in Petersen and Rajan original paper, banks' 4. These authors find that in a cross country analysis the Panzar-Rose measure of market power is more correlated with barriers to entry than with market concentration, and from this result they question the use of concentration as a measure of market power. However, they do not account for differences in credit risk premium in the calculation of mark ups.
as a measure of the banks' market power. To test this we have used the Lerner index, relative profit margin in credit lines of banks, as a measure of market power, where interest rates are actual rates charged by banks for this particular loan product and the marginal cost of the loan is calculated using data on the estimated credit risk of the bank. The unique dataset used to test the relationship between market power and concentration, together with the generalized use of market concentration in empirical studies on the effects of market power of banks in credit availability and the debate around it, makes this analysis of interest in itself.
The results of the paper have an important implication for competition policies and are insufficient to finance investments in t=1 (I1S > R1 > S1).
At t=0 banks only know that a fraction θ of the entrepreneurs that demand finance are good, but each entrepreneur knows her quality. Banks learn about entrepreneur's type over the course of the relationship, so it is assumed that at t=1 the bank knows the kind of agent it is dealing with. At t=0, when the information asymmetries exist, the lender has some discretion in how much interest to charge for the loan. But at t=1, under full information, it will charge a rate such that the return in loans is M, where M is a measure of the market power of the bank (M=1 in a competitive market, while M>1 indicates that the bank has market power).
The risk free interest rate is supposed to be zero.
In the Petersen and Rajan model entrepreneurs go to the bank and ask for a loan of a given amount and maturity. The bank responds by asking an interest rate with expected return less or equal to M. If no interest rate gives the bank an expected return larger than or equal to the opportunity cost (equal to one), it turns down the loan.
Our extension of the model incorporates the use of collateral through its amount C, where 0 ≤ C < I0, at t=0 to secure the loan. We first solve the model assuming that banks quote the corresponding interest rate and ask for collateral.
Being aware that they can take advantage of the full information situation at t=1, good entrepreneurs will borrow the lowest possible amount at t=0, I0. If D1 is the amount that a good entrepreneur repays in t=1, the amount of funds to borrow in t=1 to invest in the safe project will be I1s -(S1 -D1). Given the outcome of the safe project in period 2, S2 , and the risk-free full-information rate M the entrepreneur pays for the borrowed funds, the net-profits in period 1 from choosing the safe project at t=0 will be:
Similarly, the expected profit from choosing the risky project having pledged collateral is:
Good entrepreneurs will choose the safe project if the expected profits are at least as high as the profits from the risky one. From the assumptions of the model, safe projects will be chosen if the repayment at t=1 satisfies,
A second condition for financing the investment is that the bank expects to recover the finance provided in t=0, I0. Since the entrepreneur asking for a loan can be good or bad, the bank will get a positive return in the first case and zero in the second one.
Charging M to the amount borrowed at t=1, the return for the bank in case the entrepreneur is good will be D1 + (M -1) [I1S -(S1 -D1)]. The bank estimates in θ the probability that an entrepreneur is good, so the expected return from lending is
This value has to be greater or equal to the amount lend at t=0, I0. Solving for the value of D1 that satisfies this condition,
Combining (3) and (4), the minimum value of the proportion of good borrowers in the market θ that can get finance is given by θm (M,C) such that,
Equation (5) is an extension of equation (6) in PR.
Result 1:
a) The use of collateral decreases the threshold value on the minimum proportion of good entrepreneurs in the market that get bank finance, compared with the threshold with no collateral, θm (M, C) < θm (M, 0). Therefore, with collateral, borrowers of lower credit quality obtain bank finance.
b) As the market power M of the lender increases, the threshold value of the proportion of good borrowers that gets finance decreases. Therefore, firms of lower credit quality will get finance. This result holds with and without collateral and is Result 1 of Petersen and Rajan
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c) The rate at which θm (M, C) decreases with the use of collateral (market power) is lower in markets with more market power M (collateral), than in markets with less market power (collateral). This means that market power and use of collateral are substitutes when it comes to facilitate access to credit to borrowers of lower quality 7 .
With collateral, the lender can charge a higher initial interest rate without violating the moral hazard constraint (3) than when there is no collateral, which implies that the non-negative expected profit condition of the bank can be satisfied with a lower fraction of high quality borrowers in the market. On the other hand, higher market power means that the lender can charge higher interest rates in the future and, thus, it can extract more rents from the borrower. In exchange, it can charge a lower initial interest rate D1, which in turn implies that the lender has higher incentives to choose the safe project. Alternatively, for a given repayment, banks can find profitable to grant loans with a lower fraction of good borrowers in the market. Result c) comes from equation (5) where market power and the use of collateral enter in a non-additive way and the presence of one of them moderates the contribution of the other to increase credit availability to borrowers of lower quality 8 .
Loan interest rates
The model can be extended to predictions about the interest rate of loans. In period t=1
interest rate is equal to M but in period t=0 the interest charged is limited by the upper bound of the moral hazard constraint (3) and by the lower bound of the participation constraint (4). (5); collateral lowers the minimum credit quality that gets finance and since θ decreases, the lower bound in initial interest rate increases.
Therefore, collateral raises the initial interest rate to low credit quality borrowers. Equations (3) and (4) also show that the absolute slope of the relationship between initial interest rate and market power is lower in markets with more collateral.
Data on interest rate of loans for firms of different age in a particular market are not available. For this reason, predictions on interest rates of loans to young firms as a function of collateral and market power cannot be directly tested. What we have is data on average monthly quoted interest rates of new loans granted by bank j; loans can be to firms in different provinces and to firms of different age, old and new, but these variables are not 6. As in Petersen and Rajan, we draw the implication that a lower threshold for the proportion of good entrepreneurs in order to grant a loan implies a lower minimum credit quality of borrowers that get loans. This implication is justified if we assume that banks estimate the probability of a good borrower conditional to the information available at the time of the first loan, and they grant the loan as long as this credit quality is below the threshold. 7. That is, the cross derivative of θm in (5) with respect to collateral C and market power M is positive. 8. Inderst and Mueller (2005) postulate a model that also predicts a positive association between use of collateral in loans and credit market competition. Their explanation is based upon the finding that collateral allows lenders to extract higher surplus in competitive credit markets than otherwise and less projects with positive NPV are rejected.
observable during year t, where bank j can grant loans in several geographic credit markets (provinces) and to firms of different age. Interest rate of loans granted by a bank in a given period of time includes both, initial interest rates for loans that start in t=0, D1 in the model, and second period, t=1, interest rates for loans to good borrowers equal to Mj , where Mj represents the market power in the representative market of bank j. Interest rate of bank j will be affected by market power in a positive and in a negative way: higher market power will rise the interest of loans to good quality borrowers but will also lower the initial interest rate to low quality borrowers [equation (4)], so the net effect is undetermined. But we still expect that market power moderates the positive effect of availability of collateral in higher interest rates from the negative effect of collateral in average quality of borrowers that get a loan from a particular bank. Therefore, the effect on interest rates can be summarized in the next result:
Result 2:
Interest rates of loans to firms will increase with the availability of collateral in the credit market, but the increment will be lower in credit markets with higher market power for banks. Data, empirical models and predictions
Database
To Let PD be the estimated probability of default for a loan granted by the bank, let LGD be the loss given default of the loan and let i be the risk free interest rate of loans of equal maturity. The marginal cost of the loan for the bank in period t is the risk adjusted rate l i that solves the equation,
Solving for l i ,
The PD values are obtained for each bank using the CIR database and they are equal to credit lines in default of the bank j in period t+1 divided by total credit lines in year t.
We assume banks have perfect foresight and at the time the loan is granted they anticipate for all banks. The risk free interest rate is set equal to the one year interbank rate.
Empirical models
The empirical analysis will focus on the predictions from Result 1 and from Result 2. Result 1
refers to the quality of borrowers that will get bank finance in credit markets with more or less availability of collateral and with different banks' market power (market concentration).
Equation (5) Taking into account that the dependent variable is an inverse measure of the credit quality of the borrowers in each market, the theory predicts (Result 1) that the estimated coefficients will satisfy β1 > 0, β2 > 0 and β3 < 0.
The observed proportion of loans with collateral in a market will be a function of the amount of collateral borrowers can pledge and a function of the decision of banks to ask for collateral as a condition to grant the loan. We assume that potential borrowers have more collateral available to be pledged in richer than in poorer provinces. Wealth of provinces is measured by the house price index of the province in year t, HOUSINGit. On the other hand, the model in section 2 implies a lower minimum threshold for the quality of borrowers that can get a loan with no collateral, θm, in markets with higher market power of banks. For a given quality and personal wealth of borrowers, the proportion of loans (and volume lend) with collateral will be higher in markets with low threshold value than in markets with high threshold. In conclusion, less observed collateral can then be expected in provinces with higher market power of banks. Therefore, the variable collateral can be written as a function of wealth and market concentration,
where γ1 is expected to be positive and γ2 negative. Substituting (8) where taking into account the values and signs of the original parameters, ϕ1 = (β1γ2 + β2) can be positive or negative since the two terms of the sum have opposite signs; ϕ2 = β1γ2 > 0; ϕ3 = β3γ1 < 0; and ϕ4 = β3γ2 > 0.
The estimation method is the GMM for dynamic models with panel data [Arellano and Bond (1991) ]. Firstly, this method takes first differences in (Eq. 1) to get rid off the province fixed effects. Then suitable lags of the levels of the right-hand-side (RHS) variables are used as instruments to build orthogonal moments in the GMM estimation. The validity of the instruments will be assessed with the Hansen's test; Arellano-Bond's test for autocorrelation will also be reported. An AR(1) process for the residuals is expected in first differences, because ∆ε it = ε it -ε it-1 should be correlated with ∆ε it-1 = ε it-1 -ε it-2, since they share the ε it-1 term.
Result 2, on the other hand, refers to predictions about the relationship between where it is the one year interbank interest rate which accounts for time varying changes in the risk free interest rate, GDPCjt is the gross domestic product per capita of representative market of bank j in period t which is introduced for control purposes, and j η are bank fixed effects. The specification of the model takes into account that from (7), perfect competition
implies (1 + rjt) = (1 + it) / (1 -PDjt LGD). Taking logs to both sides of the equation we have the interest rate Ln (1 + rjt) as a function of the risk free interest rate Ln (1 + it) and of the term

Ln (1 -PDjt LGD)
that is the quality of borrowers of bank j. From section 2 we predict that quality of the borrowers that get a loan from a particular bank will be a function of the amount of collateral and of the level of concentration in the representative market of the bank.
The predictions summarized in iii) imply a negative sign for α2 and positive for α1 and α3. Results
Descriptive statistics
The amount of loans in default represents, in average for all provinces and years, 5.41% of the total loans, Table I The average Herfindahl index across provinces and years is 7.57%, which implies an equivalent to around 14 banks of equal size in the province. Again, differences in concentration are rather high (minimum value of 2.52% and maximum of 42.48%, Table I Table I provide descriptive statistics for these variables in logs. We observe the decline in interest rates of loans over time from approximately 15% average in 1985-1990 to 6% ten years later.
The decline goes parallel to that of the interbank rate that goes from 13 % to 4%. The Lerner index, Ljt = (rjt -ljt i )/rjt shows a negative average value for all banks and years, but we must keep in mind that the index is computed over credit risk adjusted marginal cost of the credit line and that the Spanish economy was in a serious recession during several years of the whole period. HERFINDAHLit is the index of credit market concentration equal to the sum of banks squared market shares in loans made in each one of the fifty Spanish provinces in year t.
COLLit is the proportion of the amount of collateral over the total amount of business loans in province i at the end of year t. 
1985-2002 Average
Herfindahl index as a measure of market power
Cournot type competition in markets with homogeneous products predicts that, in equilibrium, the average relative profit margin (i.e. the Lerner index), of the firms in the market is proportional to the Herfindahl index of market concentration. It is also shown that collusion and monopoly solutions are easier to sustain in more concentrated markets than in less concentrated ones [Tirole (1988) , chapters 5 and 6)]. These results justify the use of the Herfindahl index as a measure of market power. There is however mixed empirical evidence on whether the Herfindahl index is a good proxy of market power [Claessens and Laeven, (2003) ]. For this reason we provide our own evidence in this respect.
We test for a positive association between concentration and market power estimating the empirical model,
where Ljt is the Lerner index, dt is a time dummy variable and ηj is a bank fixed effect. We expect β to be positive. . Therefore, the hypothesis that higher levels of the Herfindahl index are associated with higher levels of market power is not rejected with our data.
Access to credit in province markets
The results of estimating equation (Eq. 1) are shown in Table II . The dependent variable is transformed so the domain of the new variable goes from minus to plus infinite: PBDit = Log [PRBADLOit / (100-PRBADLOit)]. Table II excludes cross effects between concentration and use of collateral for comparative purposes, while in Model 2 cross effects are included. Both models include as an explanatory variable the lagged dependent variable to account for persistent effects of bad loans over time.
Model 1 in
All specification tests (Hansen and autocorrelation) are verified. In Model 1 the two main explanatory variables have positive coefficients as predicted from the theory (although only the coefficient on collateral is significant) and, therefore, more collateral implies lower average quality of borrowers that get loans in province markets (i.e. empirical prediction i).
In Model 2 the coefficients of the two variables continue to be positive but now are both significant and their values are twice those in Model 1, while the cross-effect variable has a negative and significant coefficient, as expected. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction that credit availability for low credit quality borrower increases with collateral (market power) but the slope of the relationship is lower in markets with higher market power (collateral). Thus, empirical prediction ii) cannot be rejected. Instruments used up to lag t-2 for the lagged dependent variable and lags t-2 and t-3 for BHERFINDAHLjt Hansen's test gives p-value of 0.29 and the tests for first-order (m1) and second-order (m2) serial correlation of the residuals (in differences) give respectively p-values of 0.06 and 0.21, respectively. Robustness tests include estimation with market concentration treated as exogenous and with BGDPCjt in place of time dummies. In all cases the null hypothesis of no association between Lerner index and market concentration is rejected at p values of <10%. If we assume that the relationship between the Lerner index and the Herfindahl index comes from a Cournot competition model the inverse of the estimated beta is equal to the short term elasticity of demand of credit lines, while its long term value is β/(1-α). Since the estimated value of α is 0.631, then the implicit long term elasticity is 0.485. included. ***, **, *, mean statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. (Table I) Therefore, the evidence confirms that wealth conditions, availability of collateral, and market concentration (market power) are substitutes in increasing supply of bank credit to lower credit quality borrowers, in the sense that at high values of one of the two variables the marginal effect of increasing the other is relatively low.
Collateral and interest rates
We now test empirical prediction iii) estimating (Eq. 2), Table III . In Models 1, and 2 all the explanatory variables are considered exogenous since the interest rate (the dependent variable) is a bank level variable while the explanatory variables are province level variables. In
Model 3 explanatory variables are also bank level variables and they are treated as endogenous and instrumented using the Arellano and Bond one step GMM estimation system. In this model the effect of the interbank interest rate is captured with the first lag of the dependant variable since the model specification test improve with this substitution.
Model 1 is the one that directly tests the relationship between interest rates collateral and market concentration. In Model 2 collateral is replaced by the average quality of borrowers that get bank loans in the representative province of the bank.
Interbank interest rate is the variable with higher explanatory power for the interest rates in credit lines. Banks in provinces with higher proportion of loans with collateral and in provinces with higher proportion of bad loans charge higher interest rates in loans but in both cases the marginal effect of the explanatory variable is lower in markets with higher market power (higher concentration) 12 . For example, the elasticity of interest rates of credit lines with respect to the proportion of loans with collateral in the representative province of the bank is 6.8% if the Herfindahl index of the province is 3, one standard deviation below the mean, and 3,3% if the concentration index is 10, one standard deviation above the mean.
Results of Table III, 12. Berger and Udell (1990) also find a positive association between interest rate and use of collateral in individual loans granted by US banks to small and medium size firms, but they do not explore the effect of market competition in use of collateral and implications for interest rates. 13. Since the dependent variable includes interest rates of credit lines to old and new firms the effect of market concentration in interest rate is ambiguous. The important insight of Petersen and Rajan (1994 and 1995) that competition in credit markets can affect the marginal credit quality of borrowers that get finance ignores the possibility of pledging collateral. This paper extends the original model and shows that collateral lowers the marginal credit quality of borrowers that get finance but it does so in a more pronounced way in markets where banks have less market power. Alternatively, market power increases the availability of credit for riskier firms but at lower marginal effects as the availability of collateral in the market increases. That is, lack of competition and availability of collateral are substitutes in determining access of firms to bank finance. The implication of this result is that as borrowers increase their wealth and have more assets to use as collateral, parallel increases in credit market competition will not lower the access to credit since lenders can substitute market power by the use of collateral.
We also extend the predictions from the model to explain differences in average 
